Thursday 11 March 2010

Publications
A Functional Imaging Study of Cooperation in Two-Person Reciprocal Exchange
Behavior in a Dynamic Decision Problem:
Cultural Group Selection: Discussion
Dynamic Classification
Experimental Methods In Economics
Game Theory in Experiments
How do Behavioral Assumptions Affect Structural Inference
Identifying Individual Differences: An Algorithm With Application to Phineas Gage
Law and Neuroeconomics
Neuroeconomics
Oligopoly Competition in Fixed Cost Environments
Positive Reciprocity and Intentions in Trust Games
Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games
Reciprocity and Social Order
Risk Preference Instability Across Institutions: A Dilemma
Smart Computer-Assisted Markets
Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games
The Brain and the Law
The Impact of the Certainty Context on the Process of Choice
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
What Makes Trade Possible

Reciprocity and Social Order

Our innate propensity is to use personal exchange to trade with others. Personal exchange promotes cooperation by using highly evolved mental mechanisms in order to produce gains from trade. However, personal exchange is by nature designed to build exclusionary relationships and thus limited in its scope. To increase the scope of personal exchange humans have made it increasingly impersonal. This is done first through the creation and acceptance of decision-making roles that have associated with them certain rights and responsibilities, and second through the use of institutions that extend roles by designing rules that formalize these of informal decision-making rights and their interrelationship. A key feature of impersonal exchange is both inclusionary, and competitive, access to decision-making roles.

This paper makes three observations for policy-makers, interested in promoting economic growth, based on the experimental work done at the Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science. First, safeguards must be put into place to protect impersonal exchange from our innate desire for personal exchange. Second, policy must take into account the heterogeneity of individual cognitive strategies that are observed in economics laboratories. Third, policy must be test-bedded in economic experiments where the status quo is modeled as an ecologically rational response to the economic environment and the proposed policy change occurs in an environment where individuals have access to a full repertoire of personal exchange behaviors.

Full Text of "Reciprocity and Social Order" (PDF, 1367 KB)
You must have Adobe Acrobat installed to view this document.


Printer Friendly Version | Send to a Friend
CSN
George Mason University
4400 University Drive, MSN: 1G3
Fairfax, Virginia 22030
703-993-9441
email: kmccabe@gmu.edu
Privacy Policy