Personal Exchange

In this research we look at the ability to trade as an evolutionary adaptation to social environments.  Using language, theory of mind, and reciprocity, people succeed in forming trading partners with little institutional support.  Following Douglass North's definitions we call these adapted behaviors personal exchange.  Publications in this area include the following:

McCabe, Kevin, Mary Rigdon, and Vernon Smith, "Positive Reciprocity and Intentions in Trust games," JEBO, (52) 2003, pp. 267-275.  PDF

McCabe, Kevin, Daniel Houser, Lee Ryan, Vernon Smith, and Theodore Trouard, "A functional imaging study of cooperation in two-person reciprocal exchange," PNAS, (98) 2001, pp. 11832-11835.  PDF

McCabe, Kevin and Vernon Smith, "A Two Person Trust Game Played by Naïve and Sophisticated Subjects," with Vernon Smith, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, (97)7, 2000, pp. 3777-3781.

 

McCabe, Kevin, Stephen Rassenti and Vernon Smith, “Reciprocity, Trust and Payoff Privacy in Extensive Form Experimental Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, (24)1998, pp. 10-23.

 

Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin McCabe, and Vernon Smith, "Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior," American Economic Review, (86)1996, pp. 653-660.

 

Berg, Joyce, John Dickhaut, and Kevin McCabe, "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, (10)1995, pp. 122-142.

 

Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin McCabe, Keith Shachat, and Vernon Smith, "Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games," Games and Economic Behavior, (7)1994, pp. 346-380.

 

Harrison, Glenn, and Kevin McCabe, “The Role of Experience for Testing Bargaining Theory in Experiments" with Glenn Harrison, Research in Experimental Econom­ics, JAI Press, (5)1993, pp. 137-169.

 

 

 

 

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